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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------GENEVA OTERO and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of
Social Services,
Plaintiff-Respondents,
CASE NO. 16819

vs.
JOE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT, OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action sought a determination of paternity, a
judgment for past support paid for the minor child of the
parties, and an order for future support of the child pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-45a-l et. seq.
(1953 as amended) .
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER :coURT
The defendant stipulated that he is the father of the
child in question and allowed the court to enter an order to
that effect.

After this stipulation, a hearing was held on

November 14, 1979 to determine the arrearages due and owing
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the State of Utah for its support of the child through the
welfare program and also to determine the ability of the
defendant to repay said arrearage.

Evidence was presented,

stipulations as to Welfare amounts agreed to, and argument
permitted by counsel.
A judgment was granted by the trial court and against
the defendant in the sum of $4,179.67 for support previously
provided by the plaintiff, Division of Social Services, with
execution upon the judgment being.stayed until the defendant is
placed on a work release program or is released from prison,
at which time defendant's financial ability shall be reviewed.
It is this judgment that is being appealed by the defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek that the judgment of the court below
be affirmed.

Plaintiffs also request that the court hold,

as a matter of law,

that a parent is not released from his

obligation to reimburse the State for support given the
minor child, simply due to the fact he is incarcerated at the
State Prison.
ST.ATEMENT OF FACTS
An action was filed in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County for the purpose of determining
paternity, obtaining reimbursement of monies already expended
by the State of Utah for the support of the child, and a
continuing order for future support pursuant to
§78-45a-l et.seq.

u.c.A.

(1953 as amended).
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to

·"·

co-plaintiff, Geneva Otero, on March 30, 1978.

The defendant

stipulated that he is the father of the child after commencement
of the action.

Defendant was, and has been at all times since

the birth of the child, incarcerated in either the Salt Lake
County Jail or the Utah State Prison at Draper, Utah.
Defendant, agreed that a hearing beheld on November 14, 1979
to determine defendant's obligation for support and arrearages,
if any.

Prior to the hearing, the child was killed in an auto-

pedestrian accident, and the hearing on November 14, 1979 dealt
only with the subject of past support.
At the hearing on November 14, 1979 both plaintiffs and
defendant were represented by counsel.

This hearing was not

a summary judgment hearing, but an evidentiary hearing to
determine arrearages.

Defendant did not appear but presented

affidavits which stated his income, the value of his possessions,
and the fact that his earning potential is greatly impaired by
his imprisonment at the State Penitentiary.

The parties

stipulated in open court to the amount of support furnised by
the State Division of Social Services.

The Court, per Judge G.

Hal Taylor, heard oral arguments by counsel and ordered the
defendant to reimburse the State for the support and medical
expenses rendered the child in the amount of $4,179.67.
In anorder dated December 3, 1979, the court below gave
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for
$4,179.67 in support arrearages paid by the State of Utah for
the support of the child from her birth in March, 1978 to her
death in September, 1979.

The $4,179.67 consisted of $918.67
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and $3,261.00 expended as support of the child from March, 1978
through September, 1979.

The Court took into account the indigenc1

of the defendant as represented by the affidavits.

The Court

below also issued a. stay of execution on the judgment until such time
as the defendant is released from prison or is on a work
release program, at which time the defendant's ability would
be reviewed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
BY HOLDING THAT THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD BE
REIMBURSED FOR ITS EXPENDITURES ON THE DEFENDENT' S CHILD'S BEHALF EVEN IN LIGHT OF HIS
FINANCIAL POSITION.
Appellant is apparently confusing the real issues
before this court.

The main issue appears to be an attack on
:;::

whether a father has an obligation to reimburse the State
of Utah under varying economic conditions rather than whether
the arrearages were calculated under the appropriate statute.
A~pellant

is really arguing an "all or nothing" position, or

in other words he should either pay "all or nothing" of the care
of the child when the State of Utah is involved.

Appellant

attempts to hide the impact of his position by failing to
analyze what if any effect there is on the custodial mother
if and.when she is not on Public Assistance.

Respondent believes ~~

that to fail to raise the entire scope of his position, appella~~
is failing to adequately present the issues to the court.
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The duty of the appellant to support his child came into
existence at birth.

This is specifically established by Utah

Code Annotated 78-45-3, and Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l
holds him "liable to the same extent as the father of a child
born in wedlock."

This duty means that the defendant was

obligated to provide his child with the necessities of life
until emancipation, or until the child was adopted.

59 AM

Jur. 2d Parent and Child §55 (1971); Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah
136, 329 P. 2d 878 (1958); Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435
{Utah 1978).

However, defendant made

duty and his child was left in need.

no attempt to meet his
Thus, the State rescued

defendant's needy child and provided the child with the
necessities of life.
Utah case law allows a 'parent" to be sued when a third
party furnishes the parent's child with necessities.

State

Division of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 {Utah 1976); and
in Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah, 1977)., the Utah
Supreme Court stated the following:
"Whether by the statute hereinabove referred to, or
by the common law, the just and logical consequence of the
duty of parents to support their children is that if
they are left in need and a third party provides them
necessities, he is subrogated to the child's right
and may obtain reimbursement therefor."
In the present aase, the State brought this action after
it had paid for the necessities of defendant's child.

This

action was not initiated to enforce an unreasonable or arbitrary
duty but was brought so that the defendant would be responsible
for his actions and financially to the extent found by the court.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-4Sb-l.l, the State found
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maintainedby the defendant's resources-to the extent found by
the court to be appropriate-instead of the funds furnished by
the general citizenry through the welfare program.

More

particularly, this obligation is found discussed and delineated
in Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267 (1976) as follows:
"The children are undonditionally entitled to support
from their parents; and the State is authorized by
law and should be encouraged and aided as a matter of
public policy to see that the responsibility is borne by
them, both initially and in any necessary subsequent
proceedings."
Appellant would have this court believe that because he
(1) has little money, (2) is incarcerated, (3) does not have
custody, (4) will not have custody when he is released, and (5)
has not provided any kind of love, affection, care, etc., that he
simply may acknowledge that he is the father of a child and then
turn around and walk away from any and all responsibility as long
as the above remain in whole or in part.

Such is beyond reason,

and slaps the intent of the law and basic moral responsibility tha1::1
each parent has.

there~

As will be discussed in further arguments,

more to child ••rearing" than financial support.
to make financial support

Appellant tries

~

the only basis for this court or any

court to use in determining the liability of both parties.
is not sound, and cannot be the only criteria used.

This :~

Appellant

:t

has failed to show where the lower court abused any discretion ast~i
this determination.

Without such a showing, the appellant has no

:~

complaint worthy of consideration.
The record is clear that the trial Judge reviewed the
condition of the appellant.

Affidavits and argument adequately

presented the facts relevant to the financial condition of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellant.

The court, however,

..

.- :,

in this case, the temporary incarceration could not be used as a
justifiable excuse to cancel his lawful duty to support the child.
After such a review, the trial court ordered that the defendant
would need to satisfy the judgment when he is released from jail
or able to do so.
Respondent is sure that most involved in prosecuting or
defending this appeal have had expenses arise such as Doctor bills,
hospital bills, etc., where at the time they have occured, the funds
are not avai£ble to repay.

That, however does not change the fact

that services were rendered and somewhere, sometime the money
will have to be repaid.

Such is the case here.

Naturally, the

State of Utah or any other body-even the court-cannot guarantee
that the defendant will ever be in a comfortable financial
position, but that cannot be the sole basis to determine whether
a judgment be taken to establish the firm duty or not.

If the

duty is found, the State of Utah is entitled to a judgment for the
amount found to reasonably and necessarily have been provided.
Whether that amount is ever collected (i.e.: bad debts, etc.)
is not a matter before this court.

The trial judge found it

appropriate to stay collection on the judgment until the
temporary incarceration terminates, or upon further review of
the court.

This meant that the defendant would not have to pay the

judgment until he is placed on a work release program or until he
is released from prison and working on the outside.
The judgment against the defendant is a sum certain
which can be satisfied over a period of time.

The payment of

the judgment will allow the defendant to fulfill his support
by theresponsible
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outcome
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from this action will set a precedent for a father to avoid his
support obligation, and will undermine the very foundation of the1
parent-child relationship.
POINT I I
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO AVOID
HIS SUPPORT DUTY THROUGH HIS MISDEEDS.
Defendant

bas~s

most of his argument on the reasoning

that he should be judicially relieved from meeting his support
obligation due to his poor financial position and incarceration in prison.

However, defendant fails to mention that this

"indigency" is a result of his own misdeeds.

If defendant is

allowed to avoid his support duty because of his prison confinement then in actuality defendant is benefiting

financially

from his wrong doings.
Because of the fact there is no

ongoing support to be

ordered, this case is different than others that might arise.
Here, we have a sum certain which the court has found that the

'•,

defendant owes.

Part of a prisoners rehabilitiation is

accepting the responsibility of his actions.
allowed to

~hirk

If defendant is

his responsibility for supporting his child

through court approval, then this process is thwarted and little
if any good results to anyone.

Thus, defendant's duty to his

child should not be abrogated merely because he committed a
wrong, placing him in prison and making him unable to pay large
\

amounts.

But instead, defendant's duty should be postponed until ":

he is financially able to meet his responsibility and satisfy the ':
judgment.

r.\

:

On the other hand, if there was ongoing support to be
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paid, the one with the duty could request the court through
appropriate hearings, to deteI:1Inine the amount to pay while he is
in Prison.

Even those in such circumstances have a responsibility

to pay a portion of

the~r

earnings for child support.

To rule

otherwise is to say that by ones own choice of "wrong-doing,"
one can be relieved of that responsibility.

This court said in StatE

Division of Family Services v_. Clark, supra:
" ••• inasmuch as the father cannot do so (avoid
duty of support) by voluntary attempts, there
certainly should be no reason why he should be
relieved of that oblrgation by n~s misdeeds. Even
if his misconduct mav have worked a forfeiture of
his right to custody: he should not gain any
advantage from his own wrong nor should it
adversely affect the right of the child to support."
[Emphasis added]
The lower court's order that the defendant satisfy the
judgment when he is able to do so, will only give the defendant an
advantage from his wrong doing to the extent that his duty
to pay the judgment will be postponed until he is no longer
indigent.

This decision will not be that great of a hardship

to the defendant but could be very beneficial to him in the
long run bec~use he will begin to accept responsibility for his
actions and he will begin to understand the importance of a parent's
duty with respect to his child.

Thus, the trial judge did not

err when he considered all the facts surrounding this case and held
that the defendant should reimburse the State when he is able
to do so for the expenses paid for his child. The fact that
one is incarcerated in the County Jail or the Prison is not grounds
to remove the duty of support from a parent.

To rule otherwise

would invite individuals to voluntary indigency (i.e.: quit work,
etc.) for the purpose of avoiding the duty to support during times
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION WAS NOT
DETERMINATIVE OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE, BUT WAS
RELEVANT ONLY TO THE A.~OUNT OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES.
As was shown in Point I of this argument, defendant had
a duty to support his child. This duty made the defendant liable
for any necessities which a third party expended on behalf of
his child. (See Gulley v. Gulley).

Therefore, the time when

this action was commenced had no effect on the outcome of this
case because it was not relevant to whether the defendant had a
support duty.

The timing of this action was only germane to the

amount of money the State expended for defendant's child.
This issue concerning the amount of necessary money spent on
defendant's child was clearly substantiated by the State at
the trial level.
When this action came before Judge Taylor, the judge was
aware of defendant's lack of income and was also aware of the faC'
that defendant had made no attempt to support his child.

As a

result, the judge could have based his decision solely on the
decisions of this court which entitles a third-party to reimburse
ment from a parent for expenses on his child's behalf.

The

application of Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7, as referred to by
appellant reaches the same result.

To claim the court erred

by not applying the appropriate section is misleading and
essentially begs the question.

However, even if defendant's

contention were correct, the trial judge still made the proper
decision.
When this case came before Judge Taylor, defendant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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child was deceased.

Therefore, orosoective support on the

child's behalf was not an issue.

Section 78-45-7(2) of the

Utah Code Annotated concerns only prospective support.

on the

other hand, Section 78-45-7(3) of the U.C.A. is limited to
back support.

This section states:

"(3) When no prior court order exists, the court
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon,
but not limited to:
a) The amount of public assistance received by the
obligee, if any:
b) ··Ihe funds that have been reasonably and
necessarily expended in support of spouse and
children." (Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(3).)
By applying the above criteria, the trial court's
decision was a sound one.
reviewed and considered.

All pertinent information was
As a result the court awarded the

State reimbursement for the public assistance it expended for
defendant's child.

In reaching his decision the trial judge

did not overlook the earning capacity of the defendant, because
he realized that the judgment was a sum certain that could be
satisfied over a period of time.

Thus, Judge Taylor did not

abuse his discretion in requiring the defendant to pay the
judgment when he is able to do so.

The financial condition of

the appellant at the time this matter was instituted or heard
was not dispositive of the matter as argued by appellant, and
this position should be rejected.

POINT JV
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISGRESSION IN ORDERING
THE FATHER TO BEAR THE FULL COST OF REIMBURSEMENT
TO THE STATE OF UTAH.
All children have a right to be supported and nutured
by their
parents. The duties of a parent are set out in the
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case of In Re Adoption of Dobbs 531 P. 2d 303 (Wash. App, 1975):
"The general obligations of parenthood include
these minimum standards: 1) Express love and
affection for the child. 2) Express personal concern
over the health, education, and general well being
of the child. 3) The duty to supply the necessary food,
clothing, and medical care. 4) The duty to provide an
adequate domicle. 5) They duty to furnish social and
religious guidance ••• "
As indicated, then, the support_duty of a parent extends
past the obligation to provide only money.
McAhren's

Adoptio~J

In the case of

•
~
~1
~

~~-~ii~

331 A2d, 419 (M.D. 1975), the court said,

"Parenting is more than a passive state of financial obligation,

~
;~

rather it is an active, occupation calling for constant, affirma- 1~1
tive demonstrations of parental love, protection, and concern."

:d1

Several other states have realized that services, as
well as money, can be an element of a child •-s support.
McGowen v. State, 566

See

rill1

Southwest 2d.1958; Holmes v. Criminal

·111,

Injuries Compensation Board, 359 A2d. 90, 278 M.D. 60,
Brooks, 224 N.E. 2d. 561 10 Ohio Misc. 273.

Day~·

As can be seen in

j.::

~t

society, today, what is termed "Child Support" in the law, most
1

often consists of what would better be termed "Child Contribution. ~11
Seldom does the money contributed by the non-custodial parent
totally support a child.
As a general rule, the burdens of support fall heavier
It is

~I

the custodial parent who provides a home, prepares the meals,

i~

and clothes the child, often using his or her own income to

~

on the custodial parent than the non-custodial parent.

supplement whatever child support is being received.

The earning ~

potential of a custodial parent may be impaired by the necessity ~
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of always being on call as a parent.

The finances of a

custodial parent, particularly one with other children, or
with little training, may be so strained as to make it impossible
for the parent to hire a caretaker for the child while he or she
works.

A custodial parent bears the responsibility for the day

to day care, training, discipline and medical care of the
child.

The judge has discression to take these responsibilities

into consideration when deciding who should be required to
seek gainful employment to support. the child,.
require either

pare~t

The court may

to reiieve the other where there has been

a hearing and it is found that the 'circumstances warrant
relief.

Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518 (Utah, 1978).
In this particular case we have a child born out of

wedlock.

Here the mother has born full responsibility for the

care, training, discipline,
since her birth.

~nd

physical needs for the child

The child's father did not contribute anything

to the child's maintenance, nor was he able to contribute anything to the child except in the form of financial support.
An appropriate hearing was held in which it was found that
both the child and mother were in such necessitous circumstances
as to require support by the State from the time of the child's
birth until her death.

The Court took into consideration

the financial situation of the father and found him liable to the

State of Utah, Department of,:Social Services, in the sum of $4,179.67.
This amount represented the sums expended by the State for the
child's birth and maintenance until her death.

The Court took notice

of the fact that the father was in prison, and temporarily unable
to satisfy the judgment, and stayed the judgment until he was
out
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Jcelease program.

It was within the court's discretion to order the
father to reimburse the State for money it had expended in the
past for the support of the child.
Social Services v. Clark, Supra).
discretion

(See State Department of
It is also within the court's i

to stay an order of child support until such time

as the father can pay it.

Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P2d. 231
~

(Utah 1971).
The Appellant's Brief makes several assumptions about

i~

the situation of the plaintiff-mother which are not warranted by
the record.

Appellant claims that the mother had shirked her

responsibility as a parent.

However, the record is devoid of

evidence to support this conclusion.

P.)

any~

The Appellant also assumes H

that the mother was more capable of obtaining employment than

the~

father, but there is no evidence to support this conclusion in
the record.

We do not know how many other children the mother ha(:t::

to care for or their ages.
she was.

We do not know her age or how heal thy ~i
~i

We do not know whether she had any marketable skills

which would enable her to earn enough money to support herself an(
her family and pay for substitute care for the child(ren).

The

burdens of finding employment for a young woman with several
children, poor health, and little or no training could render hM
no more capable of earning a living than a prisoner.

The court

~ti

had the opportunity to observe the circumstances of the plaintiff

~.

and to weigh the relative burdens of support on the parties.
It was within the court•s discretion to relieve either parent

0f

the financial obligations of support if it felt the circumstances
and the welfare of the child warranted it.

Forbush supra.
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Respondent points out that the court never relieved the mother

~

~

~

of the child, Geneva Otero, of responsibilities to help
care for the child.

Appellant equates a court ordered amount of

money as the only criteria of what constitutes "support."
Respondent believesthat from the discussion here presented, it is
obvious that there is more than a direct court ordered contribution.
For Appellant to say that Geneva Otero contributed nothing, and
that he is being "stuck with the entire amount" is a naive
approach and misunderstanding of the entire circumstances.
The equal protection argument suggested by Appellant
was not raised at the time of hearing and so the Appellant is
precluded from raising it on appeal.

Even if it could be consider-

ed here, it would have to be considered without merit as per the
analysis, heretofore made.
The Court heard the matter below and the judgments
rendered are within the court's prerogative, there is no
evidence of abuse in such a ruling.

They should not be disturbed

upon appeal.
POINT V
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS JUST AND
REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD
NOT BE OVERTURNED.
Appellant's brief positsa hypothetical situation in
which the Appellant feels a result contrary to his position in
the instant case would provide a poor precedent according to
Appellant, an affirmance

of the trial court's ruling would be

precedent for requiring a disabled mother to reimburse the State
many years after the fact for money expended in the support of

-15-
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her indigent child.

The Appellants hypothetical is not the

case before the court, but even if it were, the instant case
would not mandate such a result.
First of all, the defendant in this case is not

disabl~.

He is incarcerated at the State prison because of a conviction
(See record) His inability to earn a living is

for robbery.

only temporary and will cease when he is released from prison.
His inability to earn a living is not something beyond his

conh~

such as illness or handicap, but is the result of his own wrong
doing, the commission of a felony.

A father (or mother) cannot

be relieved of the support of a child because of his or her own
wrong doing.

Clark supra and In Re Adoption of Dobb& 531 P.2d

~(

303 (Wash. App. 1975).
Secondly, this is an action for arrearages for support
already paid, not an action to determine support.

iii

Under the

'ill!

holding of the Clark case, the father is obligated to reimburse th·::·
State for actual amounts of support which the State has already
expended for his child.
Thirdly, a hearing was held and the financial condition
of the father was reviewed.

It was determined that he owed

$4, 17 9. 67 in past support and medical expenses.

It was also deter~~

mined that he was unable to pay this amount at present because of
his inability to earn a living and execution was stayed until
such time as the defendant-appellant is capable of earning a
livinq again.
1.

At the hearing, it was determined that:

The father was in prison and temporarily unable to

earn a living.
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2.

~I

The child was a minor

t:n

to

~I

earn a living.
3.

The father had no other support obligation.
(See Record)

These findings meet the requirements of U.C.A.
Section 78-45-7 (1953 as amended)

i~

that they take into

account,
"the standard of living and situation of the
parties, the relative income and wealth of the
parties, the ability of the obliger to earn,
the ability of the obligee to earn, the need
of the obligee, the age of the parties, and the
responsibility of the obliger for the support of
others".
A reversdl of the trial court would provide a much more
dangerous precedent than the hypothetical the Appellant raises.
If the court rules that Appellant is not liable for support,
it will set a precedent which would release all prisoners

from their obligations to support theirdependents.

Under this

type of ruling, the habitual criminal or escaped felon could
get a woman pregnant while he was out of prison and pass the
entire obligation of the support and care of the child off to
the woman and/or the State without ever carrying any of the
responsibilities for the child, so long as the father remained
in prison.

If the father was an itinerant hobo, he would

not be relieved of his obligation to support because of his
indigency.

No parent should be relieved of his obligation of

support because his own fault has rendered him temporarily
impecunious.
App. 1975).

See:

In Re Adoption of Dobb~ 531 P.2d 303 (Wash.

It is the policy of this State that a parent not be

relieved of his obligation to support because of his misdeeds•
Clark, supra.

Upholding the decision of the trial court furthers
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this policy.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have obtained a judgment requiring the
defendant to reimburse the State of Utah for $4,179.67 paid by
the State for the support of his impa:unious child.
should be upheld.

This judgment 11

That a parent is not relieved of his obliga-

tion to support his off spring because of his imprisonment,
is the policy of this state and should continue to be so.

The

Court should therefore sustain the judgment of the court that
the State of Utah is entitled to reimbursement for money actually
expended by the State for support of a prisoner's dependent child
while he or she is incarcerated.

This judgment is mandated by

the following considerations:
1.

The duty to support one's child attaches as soon as

the child is born.
or

~oid

Parents cannot contract away that obligation

the obligation by their misdeeds.
2.

When the State must step in to rescue an impoverished

child, the State is entitled to reimbursement from the child's
parent~

and in this case the father where he is living and capahle

of earning a living or contributing to the care.
3.

If, at a hearing the father is found to be unable

to provide support because of a temporary incapacity, the court
has the authority to stay execution of a support obligation until
he regains his ability to earn a living.
4.

In an action for reimbursement of monies paid by

the State for support, the State is entitled to the full amount
expended
for
the
child's
support.
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5.

It is within the court's discretion, after looking

at the evidence, to order one parent and to relieve the other
parent of the burden of support, particularly where the parent
charged with support payments is the non-custodial parent.
6.

The Court did not abuse its disgression requiring

a defendant to pay past support, and in the absence of the abuse
of discretion 1 the ruling should be allowed to stand.
Therefore, pursuant to these considerations, and the
analysis of the positions here presented, the judgment of
the trial court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Utah Attorney General

TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
DIANE W. WILKINS
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and exact

two copies to the Appellant's attorney, Brian M. Barnard, 214

7

East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on this

day of

d£--t/

'1980.
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